ABSTRACT In this paper, we extend our previous research on uniting the Cognitive Dynamic Systems (CDS) and the Smart Grid (SG) by introducing Cognitive Risk Control (CRC). The CDS is a structured physical model and research tool inspired by certain features of the brain. The CRC is an advanced feature of the CDS that embodies the concept of predictive adaptation allowing it to bring risk under control in situations involving unexpected or abnormal uncertainty such as a cyber-attack. The False Data Injection (FDI) attack is a special class of cyber-attack targeting the SG that is able to bypass the traditional bad data detection techniques. Here we will demonstrate how the entropic state, which is the objective function of the CDS, is able to detect and bring FDI attacks under control under the action of CRC. Through Task-Switch control, the CDS is able to switch on a new executive with different set of actions that affects the system configuration to bring the risk under control during an attack. With the CDS acting as the supervisor of the SG, simulations are carried out on a 4 bus-system and IEEE 14-bus system to demonstrate the capability of CRC when faced with FDI attacks. The results show that this system has great potential for future SG systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Cognitive Dynamic System (CDS) is an organized physical model and research tool that is rooted in certain aspects of the brain. With its first introduction to the engineering world in [1] and its expansion in [2] , the first practical applications of this construct was involved in Cognitive Radio [3] and Cognitive Radar [4] . Over the past few years, CDS has known tremendous progress, giving rise to Cognitive Control (CC) [5] and Cognitive Risk Control (CRC) [6] as two of its special functions. In [7] , it was the first time that the CDS and the Smart Grid (SG) were united to form a new architecture that showed great potential in handling the new problems that will be facing the grid in the future. From a neuroscience perspective, the CDS is based on Fuster's paradigm of cognition involving the following five principles: perception-action cycle (PAC), memory, attention, intelligence, and language [5] . In its simplest form, the CDS consists of two main constituents: the perceptor, on one side, The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving it for publication was Yunfeng Wen. and the executive on the other with the feedback channel bringing them together.
In [7] , it was shown how the integration of CC, considered as the over-arching function of CDS, with the SG, was well structured to handle those kind of cyber-physical systems which are slow progressing. In this paper, we extend this previous research to bring into play CRC, which is based on the principle of predictive adaptation and is new to engineering literature [8] . Although both CC and CRC are inspired by the prefrontal cortex, they are both geared towards handling different situations involving the environment. To be more specific, CC conforms well to a system operating under normal uncertainty while CRC is another subsystem that is dedicated to dealing to situations involving abnormal uncertainty such as cyber-attack. In [6] , this subsystem consisted of the executive memory and classifier. However, in this paper, we propose a more powerful architecture, that is even closer to neuroscience and risk control theory, to bring out CRC as a special function of the CDS. The proposed architecture will be evaluated on the SG in the presence of False Data Injection attacks. It will be shown how this novel construct has great potential to bring the risk associated with cyber-attacks in the SG under control and lays the foundation for a new generation of SG systems.
A. SMART GRID
The arrival of the Industry 4.0 era has been marked by the next generation of engineering systems involving Internet of Things (IoTs) and Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) [9] . Over the past few years, the cyber-security aspects of those systems have grown in importance as they have been increasingly deployed in critical infrastructures, affecting the daily life of people through systems such as the electrical power grids, transportation systems, health-care etc [10] . In the context of this paper, the greatest threat targeting the SG is known as the False Data Injection (FDI) attacks (also known as Bad Data Injection (BDI) attacks).
By collecting meter measurements from Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), consisting of different field devices or sensors, the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are able to monitor and process the important control actions implicating the SG. Those measurements are then transmitted to a control center to be processed and analyzed for errors and inconsistencies through a process known as state estimation [11] , [12] . In the SG, the state variables calculated by state estimation usually comprises of the voltage magnitudes and angles of the different buses in the system [13] . In the AC model, the voltage magnitudes and angles of the different buses in the network are usually considered as the state variables. On the other hand, in the DC model, the state variables are limited to the bus angles only. The power system state estimation is carried out using the Weighted Least Squares (WLS) method [11] and the measurements involved in the process are typically the real and reactive power flows, power injections, voltage magnitudes and angles and current. During state estimation, bad data identification is carried out to discard bad measurements to enhance the accuracy the estimated state. This is usually possible due to the fact that the number of measurements in a power system usually outnumbers the amount of states to be estimated. Bad measurements are typically erroneous measurement readings that are detrimental for state estimation. These are detected by a process known as bad data identification. Chi-Squared tests and Largest Normalized Residual Test are the most common bad data identification methods currently applied [12] , [14] . Those statistical techniques depend on the residuals between the estimated state variables and the measurement residuals in order to detect the bad data. Moreover, state estimators can be subdivided into DC and AC state estimators. The DC estimator relies on a linear system model while the AC estimator uses a nonlinear model. In the DC model, the measurements consist of the real power flows and injections and states consist of bus angles [13] , [15] , [16] . However, the states of the power system can be modified by the introduction of bad data, which is able to bypass the previously mentioned tests. Bad data are maliciously crafted offsets to measurements that are injected to transmitted sensor readings to influence the state estimation of the states in a certain way. As a result, this can result in bad control decisions being applied.
The tight integration of the cyber and physical infrastructures for the formation of the SG has open the doors of power systems to cyber-attacks. Attacks, like information tampering that have been a pest for the internet, are now threatening the security and stability of smart grids. In [17] , the authors consider the BDI attack in the SG as the most dangerous cyber-attack as it can lead to further complications such as energy theft or device breakdown on the power generation side. Moreover, they characterize a cyber-physical attack as one consisting of cyber side and a physical side. From the cyber point of view, bad data is injected into the information system through the use of information techniques for intrusion. On the other hand, on the physical side, the bad data is meticulously fabricated, by the attackers, to bypass the error detection techniques previously mentioned. Recent studies have shown that the state estimator and bad data detection are vulnerable to this class of cyber-attack [14] , [18] , [19] . In [14] , it was shown that an attacker, who is equipped with knowledge of the network configuration, could carry out the BDI attack on a DC state estimator without being detected. Due to this resulting in the estimation of wrong states, the system operator will be misled into performing improper operation decisions thereby inducing a domino effect of cascaded incorrect control decisions with disastrous consequences [20] . This is reminiscent to the 2010 cyberattack in Iran's Bushehr whereby the Stuxnet worm was providing false system state to the SCADA to hinder system protection strategies.
Current literature on research on FDI attacks in the grid are focused on the detection aspect only of the problem [12] , [17] - [19] , [21] - [27] . Few researchers have looked at the other side of the problem; bringing the attack under control [21] , [28] , [29] . It is our firm belief that more effort must be focused on this other aspect since cyber-attacks are getting more and more sophisticated. Additionally, all the detection techniques referenced earlier all share a major weakness; they all depend on some sort of pre-defined threshold in order to work. Consequently, if the attacker has knowledge on the detection method and the related threshold, all these detection algorithms become useless. In [7] , we developed a new system for control and attack detection for the SG through a dynamic threshold that evolves during every PAC. In this paper, we will expand that structure with a new mechanism that is able to bring the attack under control once it is detected.
B. CONTRIBUTION AND ORGANIZATION
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
i) The architectural architecture of CRC, tailored for the SG, is presented. As the CDS is a construct that is rooted in the brain, the neuroscience behind the principle of predictive adaptation will be expanded on and implemented in the structure. With risk control also VOLUME 7, 2019 being the topic of this paper, risk control theory and neuroscience will be united to give rise to a new CRC subsystem which is far more powerful than the one described in [6] . ii) Using the entropic state as basis for control and cyberattack detection, a novel algorithm of CRC for the SG is introduced. While the cognitive controller residing in the frontal executive is responsible for CC under the presence of normal uncertainty, a second executive dedicated for risk control is introduced to handle cases involving abnormal uncertainty such as a cyber-attack. It is shown that both systems can work together by having different action spaces that are able to handle the sections of the grid without attack and those under attack. We show through simulations that this new architecture is capable of bringing the risk associated to the attack under control for different situations. Moreover, this system also has the ability to detect when a threat is no longer a risk and to switch off the CRC. Consequently, CRC lays the foundation for a new approach for risk control in power grid systems. Lastly the importance of past experiences, rooted in the brain, will be expanded and highlighted throughout the last main sections of this paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II covers briefly the basic concepts associated with state estimation, bad data detection and FDI attacks in the power grid. Section III expands on the structure of the CDS for the SG. Since material in this section is based on [7] , this will be covered concisely. Readers are advised to through [7] for more background information. Section IV covers the neuroscience concepts of predictive adaption and risk control. An algorithm based on both theories is then derived and illustrated as an expansion of the CC algorithm mentioned in [7] . Section V discusses the simulation results of this system in the presence of FDI attacks in a 4-bus network and the IEEE 14-bus network. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper by highlighting the key results and presenting new avenues of research for this new structure.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES STATE ESTIMATION
The measurement data sent from the SCADA is essential for the real-time operation of the Energy Management System (EMS). However, since those signals are often corrupted by noise, the state estimator and the bad data detector are responsible for filtering out the data for optimal state estimation. As power systems involve an overdetermined system consisting of redundant measurements, this process discards the measurements that will be detrimental for estimating the optimal state. The states of a power system refer to the bus voltage angle θ and bus voltage magnitudes V. In the context of this paper, the DC model will be applied for our methodologies. In the DC model, measurement data comprise of real power flows and injections and the states are limited to bus angles only. It is assumed that prior information relating to the bus magnitudes is available and taken to be close to unity. Additionally, a reference bus is chosen and is set to zero radians. Therefore, state estimation in the DC model simply involves estimating the n bus voltage angles [θ 1 , θ 2 , ..., θ n ]
T . The DC power flow model has been commonly employed by power engineers and smart grid cybersecurity researchers [11] , [30] - [32] as a linearization and approximation to the AC model. This substitution to the AC model has been widely acknowledged for reasons such as guaranteed faster convergence [20] .
In the DC estimation model, shunt elements and branch resistances are neglected. Moreover, it assumes that the bus voltage magnitudes are already known and are close to or equal to 1.0 per unit. Consequently, by approximating the first order Taylor expansion around θ = 0, the measured real power flow from bus k to m is calculated as follows [33] :
where x km corresponds to the reactance (in per unit values) of the branch k − m, θ k is the phase angle(in radians) at bus k and e is the measurement error. The power injection at a specified bus i can be obtained by summing up all the flows along incident branches to that bus:
The measurement model, consisting of an overdetermined system of linear equations, is solved using the Weighted Least-Squares (WLS) problem using the following formula:
where • x is the n vector of the true states (unknown)
• z is the m vector of measurements (known)
• H is the m x n Jacobian matrix • Hx is the m vector of linear function linking measurements to states
• e is the m vector of random errors • m is the number of measurements • n is the number of variables H in (3) is a matrix describing the power system. It consists of theoretical calculations that link the states to the measurement vector z. These are known as power flow equations and these are described as vectors inside H. In the DC model, those entries are made up of a set of linear functions of the state variables while in the AC model, those functions are nonlinear. In order to solve the WLS problem in (3), we need to find the n-vector x that minimizes the index J(X), which is described as follows:
In the above equation, matrix W is a diagonal matrix consisting of the measurement weights. These weights are usually based on the reciprocals of the measurement error variance σ :
where R z is the covariance matrix of the measurement. The performance index J (X) can then be differentiated to obtain the first order optimal conditions:
where the estimate of the statex is calculated by:
In the above equations, G = H WH is the state estimation gain.
B. BAD DATA DETECTION
Erroneous measurements must be detected and identified to be removed from the state estimation process. However, the statistical properties of these errors facilitate their detection and identification. The estimated measurements are obtained from the estimated measurements in (7) using the following equation:ẑ
The individual estimated measurement error is then obtained using:ê
These errors follow a Gaussian distribution with zero mean [15] . The Chi-squares and normalized residual have been most commonly applied techniques for data detection [32] . Chi-squares test assumes that the state variables are mutually independent from each other and the errors follow a normal distribution. The test consist of a number of recursive steps involving the number of degrees of freedom of the system, sum of squaresf and a critical value corresponding to α to satisfy the following inequality:
where k is the appropriate number of degrees of freedom and α is a specified probability. According to (10),f will be large when there is a large number of bad measurements. However, since α is large in practical power applications, this technique can remove those measurements that contribute the most to the largest standardized residuals.
C. FALSE DATA INJECTION ATTACKS
FDI is category of cyber-attacks targeting the SG, which are able to bypass the bad data detection approaches mentioned previously. Numerous forms of these attacks and their consequences have been investigated in [10] , [12] , [14] , [17] - [27] , [34] . In the context of this paper, the FDI attacks simulated will be based from [20] , whereby the adversary model for FDI assumes that the attackers have full knowledge of the system parameters and topology (system Jacobian). FDI attacks involving full knowledge of the system have been proven to have more disastrous consequences. Furthermore, in [14] , the authors demonstrate how an attacker, armed with perfect knowledge of the system matrix H m×n , can maliciously inject an attack vector a m×1 to the measurement vector z m×1 that is capable of bypassing the bad data detection techniques currently employed. Hence, when a m×1 is inserted, the new corrupted measurement vector z m×1 can be summarised as:
Consequently, the state estimator will calculate a corrupted system state x m×1 instead of the original state x m×1 . The difference between these two states can be denoted as c as follows:
Moreover, in the same paper, Liu et al. shows the mathematical proof behind the attacks and validates his results through the experiments. Indeed, the authors prove that as long as a satisfies the condition a = Hc, the attack will go undetected by the bad data detector. The residual of the estimation process is demontrated as [20] :
||z − Hx || = ||z + a − H(x + c)|| = ||z + a − Hx − Hc|| = ||z − Hx||(since,a = Hc) r normal = r attack (13) As a result, as shown by the mathematical proof, the residuals due to the attack and those due to normal conditions are considered the same. For this reason, since the bad data detection techniques rely on statistical methods for the calculation of these residuals, they are unable to detect that the measurement vector has been maliciously falsified. Therefore, this results in the calculation of wrong system states that can in turn start a domino effect with disastrous consequences. Since this type of attack is aimed towards state estimation in the SG model, this implies that a can be inserted either physically by tampering with some selected meters or wirelessly by injecting the vector when the readings are transmitted to the SCADA. As a result, important components of the SG, such as the substation state estimator (SSE) at the substations, involved in state estimation are at the mercy of this type of attacks.
III. ARCHITECTURAL STRUCTURE OF CDS FOR SMART GRID
From a neuroscience perspective, the CDS is the closest system that matches Fuster's paradigm [8] when it comes to cognition. The new advanced architecture proposed in this paper is largely based on [35] , where the adaptation of the brain to various conditions is discussed. To this end, VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 1. Architectural structure of CDS, embodying CC and CRC, for SG.
in order to be able tackle the issue of bringing risk under control, the CDS consists of five major components. Firstly it consists of two executives; namely the frontal executive and the posterior executive. Similar to how the frontal cortex deals with information regarding the motor organ and the posterior cortex deals with information concerning the sensory organs [35] , it will be shown in their respective sections how the two mentioned executives attempt to replicate these mechanisms, like the brain does it. Two other components of the CDS are the perceptor and the feedback channel which link those two executives. The last module is the environment, which closes a global feedback channel whereby the entire CDS is contained within it. In this architecture, the DC state estimator of the SG is considered as the environment for which the CDS acts as the supervisor. Referring to [7] , the frontal executive is responsible for CC in the system. Hence, during every PAC, it learns which measurements to prioritize for optimal state estimation. On the other hand, the posterior executive deals with risk control when an attack takes place. The diagram depicting the architecture of CRC for the SG is shown in Fig. 1 . In the next subsections, it will be elaborated how the embodiment of each of the major components mentioned comes together for goal-oriented action on the SG.
A. PERCEPTION-ACTION CYCLE
When the environment is governed under normal uncertainty, the global feedback loop of the PAC gradually improves the information extraction ability of the perceptor during each consecutive cycle. Consequently, a continuous cyclic directed flow of information from the perceptor to the executive is set up to guide the current PAC for the actions to be performed on the environment by the executive. Thus, depending on the information extracted from the perceptor at every cycle, the executive will evaluate its current ability in order to better achieve its set goal that it was designed for.
B. PERCEPTOR
The role of the perceptor is to extract the available information out of incoming noisy measurements, which in response the frontal executive performs actions on the environment to enhance the information gain in subsequent cycles. These actions, performed under CC, are called cognitive actions.
The perceptor is made up of the generative model and the Bayesian filter, which are reciprocally coupled to each other. Thus, although the perceptor senses the environment directly, the cognitive controller, in the frontal executive, senses the environment indirectly through the information extracted from the perceptor.
1) GENERATIVE MODEL
Originally, as defined in [6] , the first constituent of the perceptor is the Bayesian generative model, which acts as a classifier for the observables originating from the environment. However, in [7] , it was elaborated that due to the dynamic nature of the SG, the Bayesian generative model would be impractical. With security in mind and inspiration from quickest detection theory, the generative model used is based on cumulative sum (CUSUM) and is written as follows:
where k refers to the current cycle number, L is the window over which the past states is being accumulated, B k is the vector retaining the cumulative sum for each cycle and x i is the vector of the states output from the DC state estimator for the cycle i. In [36] , [37] , CUSUM-based detection methods have been investigated and showed great potential at detecting FDI attacks. Nevertheless, these techniques rely on a predefined threshold in order to be effective. If the cyber-attacker has knowledge of the threshold, then the latter can design an attack in order to stay undetected. In the CDS, as will be shown later, it is possible to circumvent this issue by making the threshold dynamic using the entropic state. The entropic state is the primary unit of control and attack detection in the CDS structure, as investigated in [7] . Lastly, the use of a CUSUM based generative model has desirable properties such as the smoothing out of noise operating under the slow dynamics of the SG.
2) BAYESIAN FILTER
Reciprocally coupled to the generative model, the second component of the perceptor is the Bayesian filter. Since the DC state estimator is linear in nature and the noise can be assumed as white additive gaussian noise, the Kalman filter [38] will be utilized as the Bayesian filter for modelling the incoming inputs. Since in this paper, we are assuming that the power system is quasi-static in nature [39] - [41] , we can postulate that the state variable x at time k+1 will only deviate by a small margin from its previous values at its previous cycle k. This can be written as:
where ω k is independent Gaussian noise vector with zero mean. Using (15), the measurement equation used for the Kalman filter is formulated as:
and the covariance matrix of ω k is
Assuming that the system is slow moving or quasi-static, the process equation of the Kalman filter can be postulated as a random walk model as follows:
where v k is the process noise covariance vector which is assumed to be statistically independent and zero mean. The covariance matrix of v k is:
In both (16) and (18) the system matrix L k and the predictive transition matrix F k are the identity matrices. Using the measurement and the process equations mentioned previously, the computational steps of the Kalman filter use predefined initial estimates of the stateB k|k , and predicted error covariance, P k|k , to calculate the predicted state estimatex k+1|k and predicted error covariance, P k+1|k for the next cycle during the time update steps using the following equations:
During the next cycle, those two estimates are used for the measurement stages to calculate the Kalman gain, K k , filtered estimate,x k|k , and to update the process covariance matrix P k|k as follows:
Consequently, this computational iteration uses the preceding a posteriori estimates to predict new a priori estimates.
C. FEEDBACK CHANNEL
The feedback channel serves two special purposes in this architecture proposed. At this point in the paper, its first purpose relating to the proper functioning of CC will be elaborated. In the later sections of this paper, its second purpose relating to CRC will be expanded on. Equipped with the Entropic information processor, the feedback channel links the frontal and posterior executives together. However, only one executive can be active at the same time. In order to select which executive will be active, the entropic information processor is linked to Task-Switch Control, which is the second component of the feedback channel. Task-Switch control is responsible for determining the executive that will be operational using the input from the entropic information processor. The feedback channel is responsible for the calculation of the entropic state and internal rewards during reinforcement learning in the frontal executive. This calculation will be elaborated in section III-D (Frontal Executive), where it is more relevant to the latter's role during planning.
1) ENTROPIC-INFORMATION PROCESSOR
The directed cyclic flow of information from the perceptor to the executive is known as the entropic state of the perceptor. The entropic state is based on the principles of the perceptual posterior, which can be regarded as the filtered posterior embodying the conglomeration of the generative model, Kalman filter and entropy, that is derived from Shannon's information theory [42] . The entropic state at time k, in this architecture [7] , is written as:
where Tr represents the trace operator and diag{.} refers to the diagonal operator. In a generic sense, (25) condenses information between the filtering-error covariance P k|k−1 and the real error between the state estimatex k|k−1 and the current measurement at cycle k. The denominator in the equation acts as a normalizer that confines h k|k to attain a maximum value of 1 when the environment is under normal uncertainty. Any value below this maximum indicates the degree of disturbance or uncertainty affecting the SG. Consequently, since the SG will be facing varying levels of uncertainty during its operation, we will now define two important properties of the entropic state that will be crucial for the proper functioning of CC and CRC: i) When the environment is operating under normal environmental uncertainty, h k|k will always be positive because of the probabilistic representation of the uncertainties. ii) When uncertainties are present, h k|k will fluctuate around values which are less than 1. Thus, to distinguish between normal uncertainties, due to the probabilistic nature of the environment, and abnormal uncertainties, such as cyber-attack, a suitable threshold γ can be chosen such that if h k|k is below γ , then this would indicate presence of attack and to switch on CRC.
2) TASK-SWITCH CONTROL
Task-Switch Control (TSC) plays a distinctive role in the CDS in the activation of two pair of switches namely the F switches for the frontal executive and P switches for the posterior executive, whereby they deal with CC and CRC respectively. As mentioned in the previous section, we do not have control over the amount uncertainty affecting the state estimation. However, we can quantify this amount of uncertainty through the entropic state. Consequently, using the entropic state as an attack detector and risk raiser, we can define the following:
where ζ k is the result of detection. Thus when ζ k is 0, the F switches are ON and the frontal executive, responsible for CC, will be operating. When ζ k is 1, the P switches are ON and the posterior executive, responsible for CRC, will take over. So far, (26) explains how the system will transition from CC to CRC. However, in order to shift from CRC to CC, another mechanism is required since the entropic state cannot be relied upon when under the presence of abnormal uncertainty or cyber-attack. To that end, TSC is also equipped with a watchdog timer and an internal memory, which we will define as TSC memory. This will be elaborated in the section on CRC where we will highlight the principles of predictive adaptation and risk control theory. In the next section, the role of the frontal executive will be described. Under normal uncertainty, the latter will be the dominant active executive for control in the SG.
D. FRONTAL EXECUTIVE
Theoretically, the Frontal Executive is one of the most important parts of the CDS as it is the entity responsible for the control of the SG under normal uncertainty. In order to be able to perform its duties, it is equipped with Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Cognitive Control, both of which can be further split into the action space, planner, working memory and policy.
1) REINFORCEMENT LEARNING: BAYES-UCB
As mentioned previously, the feedback channel is also involved in the calculation of internal rewards during the planning stages of the RL algorithm [43] in both the frontal and posterior executives. At this point in the paper, the emphasis will be on the involvement of RL for CC in the frontal executive. The RL for CC is based on the entropic state, which in turn is used to optimize an objective function for optimal control in the network. Before elaborating further, a brief description of Bayes-UCB [44] RL algorithm will be given in the next paragraph. Bayes-UCB is the RL algorithm that is applied throughout the CDS. Bayes-UCB originates from a category of multi-armed bandit algorithms called UCB algorithms, which are based on the principle of optimism in the face of uncertainty [45] . In this approach to the multi-armed bandit problem, the algorithm uses a Bayesian approach for estimating the reward distribution of the different available actions. The chosen action is then selected based on the action that brings the highest reward. Hence, Bayes-UCB is an index policy that makes use of the prior distribution to select a dynamic quantile of the posterior estimates for the index of each action. Consequently, during each discrete time t, the algorithm will choose an action A t that satisfies the following condition:
where Q(α, π) refers to the quantile of order α of the distribution π. Furthermore, it is shown in [46] that if we assume that the rewards follow a Bernoulli distribution, and when the prior distribution of each action is Beta(1,1), (27) can simplified. In order to be consistent with the mentioned notations so far, (27) can therefore be written as: (28) where k is the PAC cycle number, S a is the cumulative reward for action a, N a is the number of times action a has been chosen and c is real parameter. Since the CDS is a construct that aims to be as close as possible to the brain, it is to be added that Bayes-UCB shares many similarities to the Bayesian approach of decision making in human brains [47] . With this small introduction to Bayes-UCB, it will be shown in the next section, relating to Cognitive Control, how the algorithm brings together the system configuration H of the power grid, the generative model of the perceptor and the process model in the Kalman filter together for optimal state estimation.
2) COGNITIVE CONTROL
Building on the components described so far, CC plays a key role in the CDS for goal-oriented action on the SG. The two most important aspects of CC is the planner and the policy. Throughout the PAC, the planner is involved in the extraction of a set of prospective actions from the action-space A and their evaluation during the shunt cycles (i.e., planning cycles). Under the influence of attention from one PAC to the next, the policy is then able to learn the best actions to be applied on the system. In the case of the SG, the action space consists of discrete weight values that can be assigned to the meters. As a result, through the influence of attention, the CDS will select the optimal weight values of the meters for state estimation. During the planning steps, the latter starts with a prospective action a i,j k which represents weight value a i for meter j during cycle k. This hypothesized weight value for a specific meter is then used to calculate a predicted gain as follows:
where G p k denotes the planned gain and W i,j k is the modified weight matrix where meter j's weight value has been replaced by a i . This is turn allows us to calculate a new predicted state estimate:
wherex p k refers to the planned state estimate using the modified weight matrix with the hypothesized weight value. The projected cumulative sum involvingx p k can then be calculated:
where B p k is the projected cumulative sum involvingx p k instead ofx k . Consequently, a planned entropic state h p k|k is found using:
The influence of normal uncertainties, stochastic or deterministic, will cause the output of the generative model of the perceptor to diverge from the estimated hidden state of the Kalman filter. Thus, the objective of (32) is to find a weight configuration that reduces this deviation. Consequently, any hypothesized weight that predicts h p k|k closer to the optimal value of 1 satisfies this condition, whereby the estimated state of the DC state estimator reduces the propagated variation in the generative model.
3) INTERNAL REWARDS
Building on the previous equations involved during the planning stages, we can now define the predicted internal reward, r
Referring to (33), we can define that the ultimate goal of RL, in this context, is to minimize the amount of uncertainty or disturbance in the system every PAC by always searching for an optimal weight configuration that will outperform the current entropic state. As a result of all the steps mentioned so far, the CDS learns from the past and current actions to pick the best set of actions for the future. To facilitate this task, the working memory holds temporarily the actions that have achieved the highest quantile from Bayes-UCB in (28) after the shunt cycles have elapsed and applies them to the system before starting the next PAC. Once the next cycle starts, a new set of prospective actions are evaluated. Should any of those actions achieve a higher quantile than the quantile of its respective meter in working memory, the greater yielding action replaces that previously best action. This approach towards control in the SG can also be perceived as a Contextual Bandit problem, whereby the actions performed shift the system to a new set point that the RL algorithm will have to adapt and this continues throughout the operation of the CDS.
IV. COGNITIVE RISK CONTROL
When the SG is under the influence of abnormal uncertainty, such as an FDI attack, the latter can be detected through the use of an appropriate threshold γ on the entropic state. In such situations, CC must expand its functionality to be able to deal with those unexpected adverse events [6] , collectively known as risks. As mentioned in the section pertaining to Task-Switch Control, the posterior executive is introduced to handle those hostile conditions when they occur. Under CRC, as will be shown later, we now have a mechanism, rooted in predictive adaptation and past experiences, that is able to tackle those uncertainties and bring risk under control.
Before proceeding further, we will begin by a providing a brief overview of the relationship between risk control and the neuroscience of predictive adaptation before elaborating how those two key principles are brought together in the posterior executive.
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A. RISK CONTROL Risk refers to the possibility that an undesired outcome disrupts our system [48] . Thus, risk control (or management) relates to the ensemble of actions taken to identify and control those unwanted outcomes proactively. Consequently, we can take one step further and identify three critical aspects of risk as follows [48] : i) Uncertainty: Managing risk implies always involving oneself with uncertainties. It is unclear if a situation involving risk will happen until it occurs and after it has been brought under control. Consequently, this intrinsic uncertainty cannot be avoided but can be narrowed to a tolerable level through other means such as simplifying the probability of occurrence of the risk. Hence, risk control does not guarantee perfect solutions for all situations. ii) Loss: Risk always comprise the probability of some form of loss. Risk is managed to minimize this loss, though this likelihood could be small. However when faced with risk, it is also possible that a positive outcome could result out of it. Nevertheless, risk control focusses on events that can have negative consequences on the system. iii) Time Component: Every situation involving risk is associated with a time when it no longer exists. This means that either a loss was incurred or the risk was brought under control to a tolerable level. Therefore, it is crucial to identify when this time arrives so that resources, which were allocated to resolving the risk, can be re-assigned to other tasks. The determination of this termination time is very important as in some cases, it is well-defined, and in other cases, it is ongoing. The ''time component'' might not be always stated as time but it can also be expressed as a specific condition.
B. RISK CONTROL PROCESS AND MITIGATION
A typical risk management process can be broken down into five steps [48] . The first step involves the identification of possible risks to be faced throughout the life cycle of the system. In the second step, the identified risks are analyzed to uncover their driving factors, potential impacts and their likelihood. In the next step, those risks are short-listed and the important ones to resolve are chosen. In the fourth step, action plans to counter those risks are designed. In the last step, the progress of the applied action plans are monitored. Those action plans that have been able to resolve the risks are terminated and then step one is re-initiated in search of new risks. However, mitigation plans are possibly the most powerful category of action plans that can be applied as they target the root causes of risk directly. Mitigation is the backbone of effective risk management. Mitigation actions are crafted to resolve the effects of risk events and impact drivers directly. Mitigation actions are usually associated with trigger points. Similar to the time component, trigger points signify the conditions for which to trigger the actions for the mitigation plans. Hence, it is important to have a means to detect if the risk event has occurred.
C. PREDICTIVE ADAPTATION
The principle of predictive adaptation as addressed in [35] is the next important topic to be discussed. In more advanced organisms, especially humans, there is an ability that manifests itself to anticipate changes within the organism itself or its current environment and to adapt to them before they are predicted to happen. Consequently, it can be said that this predictive ability permits the organism to preadapt to these expected changes. This preadaptation capacity is based in its ability to reorganize past and deep-rooted individual experience to shape new adaptive structures of goal-directed behavior according to their temporal relationship. It is also further proposed that this is the predominant function of the prefrontal cortex, whereby it is proactive and rooted in prediction and preparation. Moreover, in both the CDS and primates, the internal PAC becomes the neural framework for prediction and cognitive control. According to the cognit model [49] , cognits are hierarchically structured to embody a hierarchy of perceptual memory/experiences in posterior cortex and another of executive memory/experiences in frontal cortex. These hierarchies are also connected to each other at all levels in the cortical PAC. After their formation in the two moieties of the left cortical hemisphere, the perceptual memory acquires experiences through information from the senses-in posterior (PTO) cortex while the executive memory acquires experiences through action-in from frontal cortex. We will refer these stored experiences as past experiences in the next section. From a neuroscience perspective, those stored past experiences and emotional inputs will drive PAC to new adaptive behavior. Moreover, in [35] , the author clarifies that in the case of brain dynamics, there is no prospective future without a consolidated past. Before and during pursuing a new goal, there will be an intervention of the prefrontal cortex for the selection of past knowledge to guide and correct the course of action to that goal. Thus, the use of past information is the basis of prediction and error correction in the cognitive functions of the prefrontal cortex. The internal cerebral cycle running from the prefrontal to posterior cortices is essential for that predictive and preadaptive ability of cognition. Furthermore, in [50] , the author states that this dynamics requires two critical components. The first component relates that interactions between the organism and the environment involve Bayesian probability. The second element suggests that prediction is an important part of those interactions. So far in our CDS, the first postulation has been satisfied through the use of the Bayes-UCB, which is also supported by [47] on the same topic. While the second component can be seen as the embodiment of the shunt cycles between the perceptor and the executive. In cases of abnormal uncertainty, such as the FDI attack, we need a new way for error correction based on past experiences. The frontal executive is useless as it is perturbed and not equipped to face for those situations. In the next section, dealing with the posterior executive, we will show how we can modify the CDS to bring risk control using the material covered in the previous and current sections.
D. POSTERIOR EXECUTIVE
Conceptually, the posterior executive is the second most important component of the CDS. In the presence of an FDI attack, the entropic state will decrease below γ , which causes the F set of switches to be turned off. When this occurs the frontal executive is turned OFF and thus cognitive control is no longer operating. At the same moment, the P set of switches for the posterior executive is now ON. This indicates that CRC is now in control of the SG. In order for the posterior executive to bring risk under control, it is equipped with supporting structures and CRC module. The supporting structures can be expanded as follows: i) Executive memory and Perceptual memory: From a neuroscience perspective, those two memories differ from the working memory by a temporal parameter. More specifically, while the working memory is concerned with the storing of actions to be performed for the current PAC, the executive and perceptual memory store past experiences over a longer span of time.
The executive memory stores the motor actions that were present in the working memory over the past L PE perception action cycles. Similarly the perceptual memory stores the past L PE sensory information from the generative model of the perceptor. In many ways, this is reminiscent to how these two memories have been described in their respective roles in the brain. In the case of the CDS, each index (row or column) of the executive memory recalls the actions taken while the same index in the perceptual memory relates to the context in which these same actions were taken. Lastly, it should be emphasized that the accommodation of the experiences in both memories takes place only when cognitive control is operating. When CRC takes over, the F switches are OFF and experiences are no longer stored because the environment is no longer viable. ii) Predictor: Similar to how prediction is important for adaptation and error correction in the brain, the predictor is concerned with the prediction aspect of the predictive adaptation concept. To that end, it's role is two fold: a) When the P switches are ON, the predictor extracts past experiences from the perceptual library to identify the affected states by the FDI attack based on their statistical properties before the attack took place. Although advanced signal properties [51] can be used, in the context of this paper, a re-constructed mean and absolute maximum standard deviation of the stored values output from the generative model in perceptual library is used to calculate the mean predicted states and safety bounds for the states from the DC state estimator. Thus an estimate of the mean of the predicted states,x PE , from the DC state estimator is calculated indirectly from the accumulator values from the generative model stored in the perceptual library as follows,
where B j is the stored accumulator values in the perceptual memory from (14) and L PE is the length of time over which the executive and perceptual memories extend. Usingx PE , the safety limits, x lim , of x k is then defined as the maximum deviation fromx PE in the perceptual memory. Although in a practical scenario x k will be varying in time, in a situation dealing with risk whereby the states are perturbed and the real state values are unknown, x lim define the range within which x k has the highest probability to lie. Furthermorẽ x PE and x lim can be brought together to identify the attacked states as follows:
where ε x k is a logical vector that identifies the targeted states and τ x is a vector that defines the volatility or deviation tendency of the different states. In the case of the SG, where prior history of the states is available, a more suitable τ x can be estimated from the maximum known possible deviation of the states using that history. This will then lower the probability of false alarms during an attack as according to (35) , the particular state will not be considered as attacked as long it falls within a certain range defined by past experiences and history of the states. b) Once the states that are currently under attack have been identified, the predictor sends the corrected values of those states, according to past experiences, to the planner. This predicted state will then be integrated to the objective function of the RL in CRC as will be explained later. In this architecture, the CRC resolves the different risks raised by the targeted states through the shunt cycles. The higher the number of shunt cycles, the more effective the CRC becomes at handling the amount risks being faced. iii) Adaptor: The adaptor is involved with the adaptation part of predictive adaptation. Although not shown in Fig. 1 , the adaptor is also coupled to the perceptual memory. As the name suggests it, the adaptor is concerned with the adaptation process of the CDS to the current perturbed situation by picking the best action according to past experiences. During CRC, the adaptor receivesB k from the predictor.B k is a vector whereby the identified affected states have been VOLUME 7, 2019 replaced with their closest match in the perceptual memory. From there on, the adaptor is now tasked to find the closest experience in the perceptual memory that matchesB k . This can be done through metrics such as sum of squared errors or Euclidean distance. Once the nearest match is found, its indices is used to find the corresponding counterpart in the executive memory. As mentioned previously, each row or column of this executive memory contains stored past actions applied when the system was under normal uncertainty and the same row or column in perceptual memory refers to their sensory context. In some ways, it is a matching of inputs to outputs similar to how a Neural network [52] is applied. The closest matched set of actions is then applied to the system. Nevertheless, those actions, which are the closest weight combination in executive memory for the current situation, only aim at keeping state estimation for unaffected states and matched states under control. It does not directly address the issue that FDI attacks goal's are to drive the states towards some predetermined values by the attackers. This section covered how to bring CC under risk control using past experiences according to the principles of the brain. In the next section, pertaining to CRC, we will show how we can address these attacks using mitigations plans while still building on the material presented on risk control, predictive adaptation and the supporting structures introduced up to now.
E. COGNITIVE RISK CONTROL
CRC is the dual of CC in the CDS. Although they consist of the same components, they are driven very differently. CRC extends from past experiences and predictor for risk sensitive goal oriented action on the SG. Realizing that the ultimate goal of the FDI cyber-attack is the deviation of specific predetermined states which subsequently triggers a domino effect of bad control decisions, the action space is drastically different from its counter part in CC. Here the latter consists of carefully selected tuning parameters to be applied on the system configuration H to counter the malintent deviations. Referring to Fig. 1 , the planner in the posterior executive receives input from both the predictor and the generative model. Consequently, the signal originating from the perceptor represents the current situation while the predictor's input is the desired situation according to past experiences. Since the predictor identified the states under the highest risk, the planner's mitigation plan consist of tuning the parameters in H without disrupting the estimation of the other states. Although the true root causes of FDI attacks is due to attacks on unprotected sensors or false data injected, in our approach, we are treating H as a realistic root cause because of its important role for state estimation based on input meter readings. Moreover, during an FDI attack, the hackers will tend to target specific states and drive them to particular values. As a result, the parameters of the system is core for the effectiveness of such attacks. Since the essence of those attacks is the manipulation of the states, we can simplify the objective function of the RL algorithm as the minimization of the absolute Euclidean distance or errors between the current affected states and the desired predictor's states until they fall within the safety limits mentioned earlier.
Since only one mode can be operational at a time (either CC or CRC), the notations used in the planning and rewards calculation will be similar to the ones used in the section pertaining to CC. However, their actual definitions during CRC will vary slightly. Thus, the planning steps proceed as follows:
Apply action a i,j k to the j th column of H k :
where j refers to the index of the one of the affected states provided by the predictor, which has been compromised. For example, if second state is attacked, the j = 2 and the second column of H will be tuned.H k is now the new configuration matrix where the j th column has been altered.H k is then used to calculate a planned state estimatex p k for the current PAC:
where the estimated gainG k p is calulated from
Since each individual shunt cycles during CRC is dedicated to solving one of the risks at a time, the reward associated with a particular action a i k is calculated as
where x i k is the current affected state i at instant k, x i PE is its predicted value according to past experience andx p,i k is the planned value of that state if action a i k is applied. The purpose of the denominator in (39) is to scale the value of the reward between 0 and 1. Thus, this maintains the consistency of the Bayes-UCB RL algorithm which is applied. In fact, RL will prioritize actions that will bring the current state under attack to the one closest to past memories. Similar to CC, the working memory holds temporarily the actions having the highest quantile according to Bayes-UCB. However, once the affected state is brought within a range x lim of the state's past experience, it is considered that the risk is under control and hence no action will be applied to that particular column of H k since it will no longer be considered as a threat during the consequent PAC. Nevertheless,H k will remain the current configuration as long as the CDS is operating under CRC. Referring back to the time component aspect of risk control which was mentioned earlier, there will be a situation when all the risks have been neutralized and no longer exists. In the case of the SG, it means that there will be a time when all the attacks will stop. Consequently, a mechanism is needed to identify that condition and restore the CDS back to CC. That mechanism should also be able to restore the system configuration back to its original unaltered H k . The methodology describing this process is explained in the next section.
F. TASK-SWITCH CONTROL RESTORATION
In order to restore the CDS back to its primary purpose, which is CC, the TSC is equipped with a memory and a watchdog timer (WDT). Asides fromx PE and x lim , the predictor also calculatesB PE and B lim , which are the predicted output from generative model and safety limits for these values respectively. However unlike (34) ,B PE can be calculated directly by using the average of the values stored for the different stored B j values in the perceptual memory. B lim is then calculated in a similar fashion as x lim as was mentioned earlier. When the risk(s) is first detected, the TSC memory will store the current system configuration H k in its memory as reference set point. During every PAC, the predictor will use this stored configuration in TSC memory, which we will denote as H TSC , to estimate the states. When these accumulator values are now in conformity ofB PE and B lim , a WDT will trigger for the next T TSC perception action cycles. This process can be performed in a similar process to (35):
where ε b k is a logical vector that checks if the previously identified attacked states ε x k are within a certain safety range according to past experiences, and τ b is a vector that defines the deviation tendency of the accumulator values as τ x was for the DC estimator. Once the timer starts, the CDS will still operate under CRC but no mitigation actions will be performed. Moreover the stored configuration H TSC will replaceH k temporarily during the state estimation process. This allows the CDS to be proactive in case an attack occurs during this transition state. Once the WDT reaches T TSC and if h k|k is greater than γ , F switches are then switched ON and the P switches will be OFF. Consequently, the abnormal uncertainty due to the attack is considered no longer existent and thus the CDS will be restored back to CC. When this occurs, the system configuration in the DC state estimator will change back to the original configuration H TSC prior to the attack. In a practical scenario, if the configuration had changed during the attack, then the latter can be used.
G. COMPLETE ALGORITHM
After a detailed description of the posterior executive for CRC, we can now extend the CDS algorithm in [7] to incorporate the latter. Table 2 , taken from [7] , shows all the notations associated with CC in the Frontal executive while Table 1 contains those associated with CRC in the posterior executive as well as the new functions of TSC. Since the focus of this paper is the CRC component of the CDS for FDI attack in the SG, the CC aspect of the algorithm will be covered briefly. For a more elaborate account of CC algorithm for control and cyber-attack detection in the SG, the reader is advised to [7] . Algorithm 1 describes the whole process of the CDS during every PAC. Since the Bayes UCB algorithm uses a frequentist approach and relies on bounded rewards of the Bernoulli reward distribution, the variable BayesReward, defined in lines 49 to 54, is used to maintain the consistency of the CC algorithm. As the cumulative rewards can become negative during the planning process, the threshold, f , is used in conjunction with BayesReward to alleviate the effects of negative saturation of rewards. Thus, in the event that an action, which was previously considered inadequate for a long time, has now become the best action for the current situation, the use of f to bound the cumulative negative rewards, allows the RL algorithm to build up the quantile for that action faster to eventually be picked by achieving the highest quantile. Consequently, f gives an opportunity for unselected actions to redeem themselves whenever the right situations arise. Since Bayes UCB relies on bounded rewards in [0,1], 
the application of BayesReward on lines 50 and 52, is meant to deal with those situations. Hence, referring to the context presented on line 50, whereby the cumulative rewards has been negatively saturated, BayesReward is assigned a reward of 0 and used to update the respective quantile. For the same reason, on line 52, where negative saturation has not yet been attained, BayesReward will serve a similar purpose. Finally, on line 54, if the rewards have been positive, then BayesReward will be assigned those values and used for the update of the quantile values. In order to stabilize the algorithm at startup, the quantiles relating to the default configuration of the weights are initially biased with a value of α. Furthermore, cognitive confidence cycles, n cc , on line 58, are the number of PAC cycles, during which the cognitive controller of the Frontal executive will gain an initial impression of the quantile values of the different prospective actions. However, those actions are not applied during those cycles. Once the n cc cycles have elapsed, then RL algorithm will start applying the best actions learnt during those cycles. As a result, this helps to alleviate the random chaotic behavior of RL algorithms at startup. In the case of the SG, this kind of behavior can be detrimental, unless it is constrained in some way. Lastly, it was shown in [7] that this CC algorithm, tailored for the SG, has the ability to bypass one of key limitations of RL algorithms by being able to apply multiple actions across the different meters in a controlled approach. In [7] , the ability of the entropic state to detect FDI attacks was also demonstrated. The mechanism of the TSC, which is part of the feedback channel, to switch between the Frontal executive and posterior executive is demonstrated on lines 24 to 36. The reason for having the two conditions on line 28 is to provide a smooth transition from CRC to CC. This will be shown in the computational experiments in the next section. On line 36, resetting the Predictor, whenever a transition from CC to CRC has occurred, allows it to adapt to new situations using the evolving executive and perceptual memories. Moreover, the Predictor, on line 65, is run only once during this shift, thereby saving computational resources and making the algorithm very efficient. Similar to line 36, the tables relating to Bayes UCB are reset whenever a new transition has occurred. This is because the FDI attacks could be targeting other states at a different instance and thus new different mitigation actions have to favored compared to actions which have been used to resolve threats in the past. Consequently, CRC is very robust and has good adaptive properties similar to how the brain adapts to its ever-changing environment. Line 73 of the algorithm allows us to cut down the size of the action space effectively in half by using the output of the Predictor as reference. Line 74 enables the CDS to quickly switch the system configuration back to its original configuration. However, while WDT has not reached T TSC PACs, CRC will still be the dominant mode, ready to counter-attack if a new threat emerges. Lastly, since ε x k is calculated during each PAC, once an affected state is brought within the safety limits calculated by the Predictor, the latter will no longer be considered a threat in the subsequent cycles and no actions will be performed on it unless the attack changes form.
V. COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, CC and CRC will be applied to two different bus networks in the presence of FDI attacks. In the first experiment, involving a 4-bus network, it will be demontrated how CC and CRC work in conjecture to bring the attack under control. Since this is a small network consisting of a small number of states, it is shown in greater detail how the generative models, states, entropic state, weight values and switches evolve through Fig. 3, 4 and 5 both in presence and absence of attack. The second experiment is intended to show the scalability and robustness of the algorithm when it is applied to a bigger network whereby a larger number of states are under attack. As IEEE bus networks have been used as benchmarks for simulations in the other papers referenced in this paper and pertaining to this topic, the IEEE 14-bus network was chosen for the second experiment. Due to the larger number of states in this network compared to the first experiment, the results of this experiment will mostly focus on the states being attacked and how they are brought under control with CRC. For both experiments, MATPOWER [53] , which is an Electric Power System Simulation and Optimization Tools for MATLAB and Octave, was used to extract the data and network configurations required for the simulations.
A. EXPERIMENT ON 4-BUS NETWORK
The first experiment comprises of a 4-bus, 2-generator transmission network case from [13] as shown in Fig. 2 . Initially, the state values for the three buses was calculated by the solving the power flow equations of the network case data in MATPOWER. Once the state values were obtained, the signals relating to the seven meters were then calculated using (3) . From the mean of those signals, their noisy counterparts were then generated with a signal-to-noise ratio(SNR) of 20 dB to create z. For the current network in Fig. 2 , the network configuration matrix is: 
The simulation is run for 2000s. L, which relates to the generative model in the perceptor was set to 20. The initial estimates for all the incoming accumulator values of the generative model for the Kalman filter is set to 0 and the elements of the diagonal matrix Q were assigned to 6.25e-04. The diagonal elements of the R matrix were set to 0.01. From the CC side of the CDS, the action space is made up of a total of 28 actions whereby each meter's weight can be assigned any of the following values: 1 50 100 150. Moreover f was assigned a value of -0.55, α = 0.5 and the number of planning/shunt cycles to be evaluated during each PAC was set to 15. CC is started at t = 300s with 5 cognitive confidence cycles. In the simulation, CC is not started initially at t = 0s since some time must be allowed for the Kalman filter to settle on the track in order for the algorithm to work properly. The goal of this experiment is to show how CC and CRC work together in the CDS to bring attack under control. To this end, CRC started at t = 500s with γ = 0.4. L PE was set to 60 and τ x for the different states to: 4 5 7. τ b was assigned a uniform value of 10 for the relevant accumulator values. T TSC was set to 40s. The action space for CRC consists of a total of 63 possible tuner values whereby the relevant column can tuned with values ranging from 0.9 to 1.2, evenly spaced by 0.015. Lastly, the number of CRC shunt cycles to be evaluated during each PAC when under attack was also set to 15. In this experiment, at t = 1000s, x 1 and x 2 are under attack whereby x 1 is decreased by 0.5 radians and x 2 is incremented by 0.4 radians. The total duration of the attack is 300s. For this simulation, we are considering the most dangerous type of FDI attack, that is the attacker has perfect prior knowledge of H. The results of the experiment is shown in Fig. 3, 4 and 5.
As it can be seen from Fig. 5 , although the CRC module is enabled at t = 500s, the CDS is still operating under CC until the attack occurs at t = 1000s. Prior to t = 1000s, under the absence of the attack, we can see in Fig. 3 and 4 that CC chooses the best set weights for the meters for optimal state estimation. By using the cognitive controller, the system gains the special ability of learning from the past and current cycles to select the best set of weights for the future. Once the attacks starts at t = 1000s, there is an immediate drop in entropic state to below the threshold for detection, γ = 0.4, which was set initially. In fact, as mentioned and demonstrated in several attack cases in [7] , the greater the attack, the greater will be the decrease in h k|k . Consequently, the P switches for CRC are turned ON and F Switches for CC are turned off by TSC. During CRC, the CDS operates entirely on the past experiences acquired in the executive and perceptual memories over the past L PE cycles before the attack took place. This also allows the CDS to pay attention and identify the states under attack. On the other hand, the states not under attack are controlled through a different version of CC, rooted in past experiences and the principle of predictive adaptation, as mentioned previously in this paper. Consequently, the CDS is able correctly recognize that x 1 and x 2 are indeed the states under attack. Under the actions of CRC, the risk associated with the deviation of those states are quickly brought under control. In a realistic scenario, when this kind of attacks occurs, the real values of those states under attack are not available. Hence, the best that we can do is to bring those states to a tolerable threshold before the attack occurred. Thus as shown in Fig. 3 , x 1 and x 2 are brought to within the thresholds mentioned earlier in about 20 cycles through the actions of CRC. The same can also be said for B 1 and B 2 . Furthermore, referring to Fig. 4 , the weights selection for the different meters is still being done optimally during the attack through the use of past experiences. When the attack is over at t = 1300s, we can see from Fig. 5 that the CDS still operates under CRC for 39 additional cycles. During those cycles, the system will wait until certain conditions such as the running out of the watchdog timer and the matching of the past experiences and current experiences before switching back to CC. At t = 1300s, there is a slight inflection in h k|k as the state estimator was operating under a modified H during CRC to bring the attack under control. Moreover, there is a small spike in the values of x 1 and x 2 at that instant. Nevertheless, since CRC is intended to bring the system to a condition close to how to it was operating prior to the attack, this also allows the system to recover quickly once the attack is over. When the attack initially occurred, TSC stored the current H before CRC took over. Hence as shown in Fig. 3 , TSC is able to switch back to that previous H within a few cycles after the attack is over and the conditions mentioned previously are met. Lastly, this experiment also demonstrates the impact of the entropic state for control and attack detection in the architecture described. Similar to the principle of cognition rooted in the brain, the architecture proposed shows that by mimicking such properties, it is possible to bring the problem of risk associated with cyber-attacks under the control.
As fluctuations in the voltage angles are common disturbances in power systems, this experiment provides some greater detail on how the CDS differentiates those normal disturbances which are probabilistic in nature and the disturbances associated with an attack which are deterministic in nature. Any disturbance, that affects the states, propagates to the generative model as a consequence of their relationship in this architecture. As a result, this then influences the computed value of the entropic state. Since the entropic state is an embodiment of the grid's performance, the results of the simulation in Fig. 3 shows how the entropic state is expected to behave under normal conditions and how it decreases when an attack takes place. However, since the goal of the algorithm is the optimization of the entropic state to a value of 1, it tries to keep those disturbances to a minimum and maintain the evolution of the states in a controlled manner. As shown previously, the deviation of the states when the attack takes place propagates through the generative model which consequently causes a significant decrease in h k|k . Nevertheless, during CRC, through the use of past experiences, the architecture is able to bring h k|k under control as shown in Fig. 3 .
B. EXPERIMENT ON IEEE 14 BUS NETWORK
In this second experiment, the scalability of this algorithm towards a bigger network and larger attack is investigated. To this end, an attack will be targeted at six of the thirteen states of the network. Similar to the first simulation, the running time is 2000s and L have the same values. 30 cognitive confidence cycles were evaluated. The diagonal elements of the Q matrix were assigned to 0.0144 and those of the R matrix were set to 0.01. For the CC side of the CDS, the action space consists of the same possible weight values for the different meters as mentioned previously. Additionally, f was assigned the same value of −0.55, α = 0.35 and the number of planning/shunt cycles to be evaluated during each PAC was set to 30. Referring to the CRC side of the CDS for the experiment, γ was set to 0.4 and L PE to 60. τ x was a uniform vector of 5 for the different states while τ b was similar to the first experiment. Moreover T TSC and the action space were also the same. Since the network is bigger, the number of CRC shunt/planning cycles was increased to 20. Asides, the other unmentioned parameters were the same as the first experiment. The attack occurs at t = 1000s and affects the states in the following way: decrease x 1 by 0.5 radians, decrease x 2 by 0.6 radians, increase x 3 by 0.3 radians, decrease x 6 by 0.8 radians, decrease x 8 by 0.6 radians and increase x 9 by 0.5 radians. Thus, the FDI attack in this case targets almost half of the total number of states. The attack time and duration follow the same pattern as in experiment one. The results of the simulation for the IEEE 14 bus network is shown in Fig. 7 and 8 . As the network is bigger, the results will pertain only to the affected states and the switch status. Referring to Fig. 7 , it can be seen that the attack is detected immediately as it occurs at t = 1000s with the drop in the entropic state and that the system is effectively able to bring the risk, associated with the deviations of attacked states, under control through the use of past experiences. Moreover when the attack is stopped at t = 1300s, it takes the CDS around 61 cycles to switch back to CC mode as shown in Fig. 8 . Thus, the algorithm is very robust and can be effectively scaled to tackle FDI attacks in bigger networks.
The two computational experiments demonstrated in this section were carried out on a system running Windows 10 with an Intel i7-8750H processor. The computational running time of the first experiment was 1.8s and 3.2s for the second experiment. Referring to [7] , where it was discussed how the use of the entropic state of the CDS as detection method for cyber-attack has lower computational complexity compared to other detection methods if applied in a medium or largescale power system, it was shown in this paper and simulations how indeed it is possible to upgrade the architecture in [7] to be able to handle attacks by using the brain as inspiration. Furthermore, the application of CRC in the CDS for the SG is novel since it is a revolutionary system catering to the triple purpose of control, attack detection and attack mitigation in the grid. In order to scale up the architecture described in this paper for bigger networks, the number of CC shunt cycles will have to be increased as a larger number of meters will be involved and required to be evaluated. Furthermore, it is beneficial to still keep the action space small to allow the planned rewards, during planning, to be relatively differentiable from each other. Moreover the diagonal elements of Q also have to be scaled up when applied to larger grids. In the first experiment, the diagonal elements of that matrix was 6.25e-04 while in the second experiment it was 0.0144. However unlike many applications where the elements of the Q matrix is supported by a mathematical formulation [53] , the constituents of Q in this system have to be defined by the designer as Q serves the dual purpose of control for CC and sensitivity of attack detection. Consequently, prior simulations using past historical data can be used to determine the right value of Q for the application. Reference [7] goes into more detail in their determination. For bigger networks, the number of CRC shunt cycles can also be scaled up according to the number of states and response time that the designer will find more convenient contingent to past available historical data or simulations.
In both simulations, the CDS was quick to detect the attack in a matter of a few cycles because of the nature of the attack. Nevertheless, the detection time can increase slightly when other types of FDI attack such as the slowly evolving ramp attack is applied. Consequently, in this case, the sampling time of the DC state estimator will have a large impact on the overall performance. For example, if the states are estimated every 4s, then it can take up to 40s to detect such kinds of attack depending on their intensity. However, in a realistic scenario, many states will have to be targeted at the same time to drive the grid to a bad situation. The detection property of the architecture excels in such situations; the greater the amount of the states under attack, the greater will be the deflection in the entropic state. As a matter of fact, the system will be very robust for practical applications. On the other hand, the detection accuracy can also be improved at the cost of higher sampling frequency. The elements of Q can also be tuned or the threshold for attack detection increased. It was also shown how the CDS embedded with the state estimator to give rise to the new construct explained in this paper is able to mitigate the attack as it is able to modify the current H used in state estimation in such a way that it nullifies the hacker's attack which was designed using his prior knowledge of H. From the CRC side, it is possible to mitigate the attack faster by choosing more appropriate tuner values. Lastly, the determination of τ x and τ b using past historical will be convenient if the system is applied in a practical scenario. In the first and the second experiment, τ x was different as the deviation tendency is bigger in a smaller network consisting of a smaller number of meters, compared to a larger network where the larger number of meters provides a smoother deviation tendency.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper is novel for the following reasons:
i) This is the first time that we have been able to incorporate the CRC with the previous the structure referenced in our earlier paper to give rise to a new construct that is able to bring the problem of attack in the SG under control. We believe that the architecture proposed has great potential in handling the risks associated with attacks that the grid will face in the future as the networks become more interconnected. ii) The CRC algorithm presented in this paper, tailored for the SG, is revolutionary as it is possible to unite the important topics of risk control theory, neuroscience and control theory to bring about a new way of tackling risk the way the brain would approach it. Moreover, the algorithm is more elaborate, extensive and powerful that the one mentioned in the CRC paper referenced in the introduction. iii) The construct described is able to serve the triple purpose of a new kind of control and attack mitigation, which are both based on cognition, and cyber-attack detection. In this paper, it was shown how the previous structure in [7] was united with CRC to bring the issue of attack in the SG under control. With the CDS, being a construct rooted in the brain, it was demonstrated how it was possible to bring together neuroscience and risk control theory to give rise to the architecture discussed in the paper. The computational experiments were able to validate the effectiveness, robustness and scalability of the algorithm in bigger networks. A discussion regarding the choice of parameters was also provided. Since the DC estimation model was the main model in this paper, future orientation of research in this topic can be geared towards the application of this construct in AC state estimation, where reactive components are involved. Compared to the DC model, the AC estimation model is recursive in nature. Consequently, a new procedure to unite the AC estimation model and the perceptor will have to be designed to make the process computationally efficient. Although CRC has also been applied in other fields such as Vehicular Radar Systems [54] , where optimal state estimation and tracking are crucial, CRC generally has to be tailored for the desired application. To that end, the mathematics involving the perceptor and both executives have to be modified according to the goals of the different intended applications.
Another potential of the CDS for this application, which was not explored in this paper, is the identification of the attacked sensors. During CRC, the estimated measurements, rooted in past experience, can calculated using an a modified version of (8) as follows: z = H TSCx (41) and the absolute estimated errors,ê, associated with the measurements can be calculated usinĝ
A suitable threshold can then be defined to identify the attacked meters. Thus, if the absolute error associated with a particular meter is above that threshold, then it is highly likely that the sensor is under attack. Consequently, through this identification process, the operator can initiate corrective measures accordingly.
